The secretary-general of FAES, Javier Zarzalejos, assures that the decision is a “civic and democratic failure” FAES Analyses the Strasbourg Judgement on the ‘Parot Doctrine’

22/10/2013

The secretary-general of FAES Foundation, Javier Zarzalejos, has analysed the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights whih has ruled against applying the 'Parot Doctrine' and has considered that the the decision is a “civic and democratic failure the retarded effect of which is now being suffered”.

The judgement of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rules on a sensitive legal question in the worst possible way regarding the demands of justice and redress which should be faced by those real serial murderers who do not preach regret or show any sign of reintegration whatsoever.

But the Strasbourg judgement, unfortunately, is not just relevant in itself. It is also sobecause of the context on which it is placed. It is in this context, rather than in itsargumentation, that the judgement argues not so much a legal blunder of the Spanish courts in the development and implementation of the so-called "Parot doctrine", but rather a civic and democratic failure the retarded effect of which is now being suffered, most notably, by the direct victims of terrorism.

First, it is not true that "politicians" in general passively witnessed the benefits of thepenalty redemption for terrorists offered by a criminal legislation which, inherited from Franco, paradoxically seemed to fit in very well with the over-zealousness for guaranteesof the left and its alleged righteousness, and with the tendency of Basque nationalism to exonerate terrorists from any responsibility, legitimising them instead as actors in the "conflict". Passivity, which certainly existed, was indeed displayed by the successivesocialist parliamentary majorities since 1982, supported by nationalists, who made talking about the need to make terrorists serve full sentences an undemocratic taboo. With theexcuse of not breaking the unity of the fight against terrorism and branding the serving of full sentences as unconstitutional as this would be contrary to the purpose of reintegration, the initiatives set forth by the PP in this regard were rejected time after time. The Criminal Code of 1995 addressed the issue in an obviously insufficient manner, so that only in 2003–the first term in which the PP had an absolute majority–the legal reform which now ensures the effective enforcement of penalties for these crimes of the utmost gravity was passed.

Second, the fault cannot be attributed to a distant court, aloof to the tragedy that has caused terrorism in Spain. There is a Spanish judge in the Court, with a political career and senior positions in the Ministry of Justice during the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. A judge who had already expressed his prejudice, in the literal sense of the term, against the "Parot doctrine". It is thus not surprising that if the Spanish judge advocates the invalidity of that doctrine, the others will follow suit not only in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights but on the interpretation of national legislation. But neither the invalidity of the "Parot doctrine" was self-evident, asnow many try to claim, nor was the Court lacking case-law arguments to support its validity.

Third, the so-called "derogation" of the "Parot doctrine" was part of the political negotiation that the previous Government undertook with ETA, under the pious label of "peace process". As chance would have it, the Strasbourg judgement has been issued at the same time as the ruling of the Spanish High Court regarding the "caso faisán" in which the court considers that there is proof of the link between the "tip off" to ETA's extortion network and the negotiation that was taking place. There were political negotiations, compensations for the terrorist organisation that compromised the Rule of Law were put on the table, and among them the "Parot doctrine" became of paramount importance.Looking at the haste with which some of the ideologues of that negotiation demand the immediate generalisation of the judgement for the release of terrorists allegedly benefited by it, it is not unreasonable to see in the ECHR's judgement the inertia of a politicaloperation led by Rodriguez Zapatero who, during his negotiations with ETA, assumed that the cessation of terrorism required, to begin with, the dismantling of the legal architecture with which ETA was being defeated. The fact that the government of the PP has to deal with this inertia is an undesirable legacy–another one–but in any case, a demanding responsibility.

Fourth, with the "Parot doctrine" repealed and the Parties Law neutralised by the Constitutional Court with the legalisation of Sortu, the goal of dismantling the legal architecture which forced ETA to desist from terrorist violence, is unfortunately succeeding, aggravated by a legitimising discourse that arises from the judgement of the "caso faisán".And all this has happened, is happening, without repentance, without any condemnation of ETA's criminal history, with no waiver of intimidation, without any correction the totalitarianproject, with the victims fighting for an account that safeguards their dignity and memory.Thinking that what is happening will not have consequences or that it is the unfortunate liquidation of past episodes would just be a reckless disregard for the future of the Basque Country and of Spain".