ANALYSISWhy is Russia Getting Involved in the Conflict in Syria?, by Mira Milosevich

16/09/2015

The FAES Foundation analyst and expert on international affairs, Mira Milosevich, claimes in the last FAES Analysis that "since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Russia has not changed its objectives of national security or foreign policy". "Putin thinks that if Syria becomes a failed state, it will be an extraordinary opportunity to increase Russia’s presence and influence in the region", points out. In her opinion, "its main objective is the fight against the Islamic State, to prevent their spreading to the Caucasus, as their territorial security depends on this".  

"Unlike Western hesitations which now, due to migratory pressure, are forced to improvise, Putin has a plan, which does not mean that he will get it accomplished", says Milosevich, who explains that "the war in Syria is not just a conflict over control of territory and resources in a failed state. It also entails clashes between Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, between the two major branches of Islam (Sunni and Shiite), between Russia and the West, in addition to the internal breakdown of Jihadism and the changing of the balance of power in the region. In any case, Russia is preparing itself for all future scenarios because their intention is not to abandon their influence in the Middle East".

"SATELLITE IMAGERY (published by Stratfor) revealing that Russia is building an operating base in the Bashar al-Assad airport in Latakia, and increased military support to the Syrian regime, are evidence that Russia is ready to defend its interests in the area. Once again, Western politicians have misinterpreted Russia's strategy, as Moscow’s contacts both with the Syrian opposition and with the USA, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt and Qatar, had led them to infer that Russia would withdraw its support to the weakened dictatorship of al-Assad. President Obama, in speeches delivered on July 6 and 14, said that "Russia may play a positive role in Syria." But the US’ recent request to Greece and Bulgaria –to prohibit the use of their airspace to Russian airplanes carrying military aid to Syria– is a clear sign that Obama does not believe in the peaceful and constructive role of the Russians anymore.

However, the fact is that since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, Russia has not changed its objectives of national security or foreign policy. The Kremlin's support to al-Assad continues because the Russians think that it is not over yet (while acknowledging that it has lost control of most of the territory, even though it still has the most populated area). Putin thinks that if Syria becomes a failed state, it will be an extraordinary opportunity to increase Russia’s presence and influence in the region. On top of that, Moscow wants to reiterate its disagreement with the strategy followed by the US in the fight against terrorism, considering that it basically consists of a regime change. Protecting their only outlet to the Mediterranean, the naval base of Tartu, is not irrelevant either; but its main objective is the fight against the Islamic State, to prevent their spreading to the Caucasus, as their territorial security depends on this. Their foreign policy's geopolitical reasons are very complex, given the volatility of the area and the number of actors directly or indirectly involved in the Syrian conflict.

Moscow's hectic diplomatic activity did not involve the withdrawal of support to al-Assad, but the attempt to create and lead a coalition against the Islamic state and a peaceful transition in Syria, thus strengthening its international image (badly damaged in the Ukrainian conflict). Meanwhile, it will continue with its usual formula of "diplomacy through weapons" (as a supplier of arms to all sides in the conflict). Some of its other goals are also important: keeping their traditional image of being a loyal protector of their customers and allies (in contrast to the US, which has weakened its alliance with Saudi Arabia due to the nuclear deal with Iran). Moreover, since the Yom Kippur War (1973), in which the coalition of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, backed by the Soviet Union, was defeated and humiliated by the Israelis with the help of the US, all Russian leaders have been obsessed with regaining influence in the Middle East. Given the current isolation of Russia and the US shift of alliances, Putin will not lose the opportunity to try to become the arbiter of conflicts in the region.

Unlike Western hesitations (Obama's red lines regarding the use of chemical weapons have become pink lines) which now, due to migratory pressure, are forced to improvise, Putin has a plan, which does not mean that he will get it accomplished. It is true that it has allies and military force in the area. To start with, it has already strengthened its alliances with Sunni-majority countries, which have been abandoned by the US after Obama's agreement with Iran.

The biggest obstacle to his ambitions is the number of players involved: USA, al-Assad, the divided Syrian opposition, the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia, various terrorist organizations among which are Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Getting a coalition against the Islamic State is a logical purpose (as everybody has it as a common enemy) but hard to get among so many actors with competing interests.

The war in Syria is not just a conflict over control of territory and resources in a failed state. It also entails clashes between Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, between the two major branches of Islam (Sunni and Shiite), between Russia and the West, in addition to the internal breakdown of Jihadism (between the Islamic State and other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda) and the changing of the balance of power in the region. In any case, Russia is preparing itself for all future scenarios because their intention is not to abandon their influence in the Middle East".