24/07/2013
PhD in international relations from UAM and is a postdoctoral researcher at the University Carlos III of Madrid.
The coup d'état in Egypt perpetrated by its armed forces has raised a number of issues regarding the evolution of those States that suffered the already withered process of change termed as "Arab Spring". While some media campaigns fought tooth and nail to defend the opportunities posed by such processes, the reality of each context has placed each transition process in its due place. The Egyptian geopolitical position means that the vagaries of its transition process will have regional and not just domestic implications, framed in a context of competition for power between various regional powers such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, and global powers as the U.S. or China. Egypt's internal divisions reflect those of the Middle East as a whole.
The rise of Morsi and of the Muslim brotherhood to power deteriorated Egypt's traditionally cordial relations with the United States. While Mubarak turned out to be one of the US' major allies in the region, President Obama said about Morsi, a few months after his coming to power, that he "is not an ally but not an enemy", expressing a clear evolution from the initial conciliatory attitude toward the Islamist leader. Not even the extensive support offered to the Egyptian army has helped to exert an influence which has rapidly vanished amid secular opposition accusations of U.S. support to Islamists. U.S. influence is declining and cannot do much to alter the events given the resources it has today.
Regional powers play their game with more interest and expertise, supporting their favourites in a context of changing regional balances. Their game is probably, for the first time in decades, the really important one and the survival of their different regimes one of the main motivations for their behaviour. The government of Syria and some Persian Gulf monarchies are, paradoxically and despite being openly confronted both at a diplomatic level and in the battlefield, the main beneficiaries of Morsi's fall, while Qatar, Turkey and even Iran--benefited by a less submissive foreign policy to the United States--are the most damaged. Against this backdrop, the European Union, which has no means to exert influence, and no unity or political will to use them, is absent as usual and in all probability will remain that way. Emerging powers are only interested in protecting their interests without getting involved in any external interference.