28/10/2014
Mira Milosevich, Lecturer of International Relations at IE University, School of International Relations.
Six of the twenty-nine parties that have run for the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine have won more than 5% of the vote and have thus ensured their presence in Parliament, the Supreme Rada. The victory of the pro-European parties – Poroshenko Block (of the President Petro Poroshenko), National Front (of the current Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk) and the Self-Help Association (founded by the mayor of Lviv, Andri Sadovi) – ensures the creation of a coalition government of European vocation. The new government will have to address four old outstanding tasks: rebuilding the State, consolidating the fragile peace agreement in Donbas, fighting corruption and adopting unpopular measures necessary to make structural reforms in the economy. Their success or failure does not depend on their opponents in the Rada – Yuri Boiko's Opposition Block (grouping MPs of the former Party of the Regions of the fleeing President Viktor Yanukovych), Oleg Liashko's Radical Party and Yulia Timoshenko's Homeland – but rather on their ability to reconcile their political aspirations, fulfilling their election promises and not falling into the personalistic struggles witnessed after the Orange Revolution in 2004, and which ended the pro-European government of the time.
The three pro-European parties share a desire to adopt modernisation and democratisation measures in Ukraine, but not their vision of the peace agreement and the relationship with Russia, which is one of the keys to Ukraine's survival. Poroshenko could become isolated in the Rada due to his peace plan in Donbas, since both his main coalition partner, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and the opposition parties, are against the plan, and demand the military defeat of the pro-Russian separatists. If Kiev chooses to defeat the insurgents, and considering that Russia has already demonstrated that it will not allow it, a tougher wart could arise instead of peace.
State reconstruction involves creating institutions that ensure legality and transparency, and a new State model (the current model is a centralised State, with the central government appointing the local governors) would give more power to the regions (not only to Donbas). The dire economic situation can only be overcome with the help of the EU and the IMF.
These elections have legitimised the aspirations of the Maidan revolution, but they have also delved into the ancient division of the country: the citizens of Crimea, annexed by Russia, and of Donbas have not voted, nor have they had a political representative among the parties that did participate.
Other data reflect the political and social context that Ukraine is going through: the 52.42% turnout at the elections has been the lowest since Ukraine's independence (1991), which shows public disaffection with the political class. The controversial Lustration Law adopted shortly before the election, legalised the expulsion of all officials suspected of supporting former President Yanukovych, which left state institutions without 30% of qualified employees. Those who practised during the election campaign the so-called 'trash bin test' for corrupt politicians – throwing corrupt politicians into a container – have gone unpunished. Although the novelty of these elections was the presence of civil activists and paramilitary volunteers of the Donbas war in the electoral lists, there still remain, this time in the shade, men who are not that new: the oligarchs who have financed both the election campaign and the war in the Southeast and who will maybe charge their toll in political terms.
Given all this, there still remains to be seen how the new Ukrainian government will advance on its pro-European path.