13/02/2015
The second cease-fire in Ukraine (Minsk II) between the Government of Kiev and the pro-Russian separatists, signed after marathon rounds of negotiations between the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany, has not achieved the goal prematurely announced by François Hollande: to give a final solution to the conflict in south-eastern Ukraine. In fact, Minsk II was based on the same assumptions as the previous treaty (Minsk I), the main purpose of which was to stop the war, given the high number of fatalities.
The two warring parties have not changed their strategies: Ukraine aspires to preserve its territorial integrity and integrate into Western institutions, while the Kremlin, which economically and militarily supports the insurgents, is still trying to prevent the approach of Ukraine to the EU and NATO while keeping its zone of influence in the southeast of the country. Neither have the EU nor the US changed theirs: political and economic pressure on Russia and continue supporting Ukraine. Therefore, the goals of the two subsequent agreements should be compared to raise the question of the likelihood of imposing the second.
Minsk II reflects a new phase in the Ukrainian crisis both in its military and in its political aspect in two levels: the regional conflict in Ukraine and the geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia.
The military aspects of the regional conflict are terrible for the government of Kiev. The separatists have surpassed the demarcation established in Minsk I (September 7, 2014) and have launched a new offensive, attacking Debaltseve and Mariupol, two cities of great importance, both to open a corridor between Luhansk and Donetsk and to ensure a land exit to Crimea and the Sea of Azov (as shown on map). Military pressure and the conquest of new territories by the separatists have pushed Poroshenko to negotiate again with Putin, which many Ukrainians have already called treason.
Source: Süddeutsche Zeitung
Minsk I was signed in an environment which clearly rejected the possibility of NATO, the US and the EU entering into a military standoff with Russia. Now the US does not rule out giving weapons to the Ukrainian army (although they do not lack weapons, but qualified military commanders and a clear strategy to combat the hybrid warfare posed by Moscow). The EU (except Poland and the Baltic States) strongly opposes because arming Ukraine would mean becoming more involved in the conflict and would push Europe into a cold war–or hot–against Russia. The NATO’s role in the crisis has been seemingly modest, given that Ukraine is not a member of the alliance. However, this crisis has forced it to create Rapid Reaction Forces and ensure the frontiers of member countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
On a political level, Minsk II is more favourable to the separatists than Minsk I: it recognises their new territorial conquests, because it does not specify the front line and sets the line of withdrawal of heavy weapons within 50 kilometres of the demarcation of Minsk I. Furthermore, it promises them a substantial autonomy (militias will have the right to to create their own legal institutions and keep Russian as their official language, which was not specified in Minsk I). Moreover, Minsk II states that Kiev will monitor the border with Russia from the end of 2015. Russia has been granted the possibility of arming the separatists should Kiev not fulfil its promises. Thus, the peace agreement opens a door to war.
The geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia in Ukraine has definitely marked the end of the European order emerging after the collapse of communism, although some dissolution symptoms had already appeared long before, after NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 or the war in Georgia in 2008, to name a few.
The best hope for success of Minsk II lies in the fact that Angela Merkel and François Hollande have decided to get involved personally and have announced that they will closely monitor its imposition and development. Their reasons are clear: trying to prevent the conflict from spreading by casting over it the shadow of the Franco-German bloc, which still has political clout, and thus diminishing the military influence of the US, besides protecting the business interests of France and Germany in Russia. Germany has emerged as a major European power from the Ukrainian crisis, not because it is especially anxious to have such a leadership (given its past), but because the traditional European international actors–Britain and France–are weak.
Whatever the outcome of Minsk II, two events will not be erased: 1) during this crisis, Europe has been too weak to effectively uphold international law regarding the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 2) The period between 1989 and 2014 of the European order is history. We now stand before a new European disorder.