06/10/2015
Juan Carlos Jiménez Redondo is Tenured Lecturer of History of Thought and Social Movements, San Pablo CEU University
The victory of the centre-right coalition in Portugal breaks some ideological clichés, very widespread in recent times. For example, the idea that any government that implements tough austerity measures will receive such a strong electoral punishment that it will prevent it from continuing in power. The Portuguese case demonstrates that although the commitment to austerity creates a definite erosion, it can be compatible with a comfortable majority in the polls. The problem is not the austerity policies themselves, but rather the ability of the governments that adopt them to empathize with citizens. To be able to convince them both of their immediate need and their position as an indispensable instrument for a strong and stable recovery. The great success of Pedro Passos Coelho has been to turn the problem of financial conditioning into an opportunity for the structural transformation of the Portuguese economy. And he has done so from a position of independence that has given him enough credibility to move along the path of liberalization beyond what was required by the troika. And that credibility has convinced an impressive 39% of voters that the Prime Minister was not a simple manager, boring and bureaucratic, of the bailout program, but the leader of an project for active change which used cuts as its instrument, although they were in no way an end in themselves, but the way to creating a healthier and more competitive economy.
Another cliché used is the idea that austerity leads to the radicalization of an important sector of society. It is true that reforms have fuelled the opposition from those who believe that the State has to be the great – and even the sole – economic and social actor, and of those who self-erect themselves as the ‘voices of the people’, and that all of them are able to create a wide radical rhetoric. But that does not necessarily translate into an automatic heeling of the electorate over to extremist or populist options. The Left-Wing Bloc has doubled its percentage of votes, but it still represents a relatively modest 10% of the total, and that radical expression barely reaches 18% if you add those of the communists and greens grouped in the Unitarian Democratic Coalition. However, you cannot hide that the crisis and its management generate nihilistic demonstrations expressed in electoral options of rupture, as evidenced by the seat obtained by People-Animals-Nature (PAN).
Ultimately, Portuguese citizens have shown a high degree of responsibility when assessing the actual efforts and possibilities of political action. They have fled illusions and have focused their support on parties that can provide them effective solutions to their plight. Hence, even though the resulting Parliament has shifted to the left, ‘Portugal à Frente’ and the Socialist Party continue to represent 70% of the electorate. Regardless of the scenarios that may open in the absence of an absolute majority of the winning coalition, the moderate and centred positions of Portuguese socialism seem to ensure a situation of political stability that will allow the final ‘normalization’ of the country after the hard measures of the troika .