01/03/2017
Alfredo Crespo Alcázar es analista y profesor
Alfredo Crespo Alcázar is analyst and professor.
After 23 June, the Labour Party is the one moving through certainly complex grounds. The “primaries” through which Jeremy Corbyn was re-elected as leader last September have not entailed the end of the division reigning in said grouping, remarking the recent return to the blairism debate. It is a significant phenomenon, but which correlates merely transversally with the posture adopted towards the EU for the current Labour leadership.
Indeed, blairism implies an approach to politics entirely contrary to the one defended by Corbyn and the radicalized Labour bases, which speech (particularly when they refer that the aim of Theresa May’s Government is to give the British public services to the United States corporations) brings Labour closer to the rising left-wing populism which stands out across the “old continent”, along with connecting it with the years of Michael Foot, whose extremism translated into large electoral defeats. Thus, the Labour Party currently turns to a dogmatism surplus based on statements far from reality, being the main one that pointing out that the dichotomy inequality – exploitation increases in the United Kingdom.
Blair’s intervention from few days ago does not diverge from what has always been his party and European Union model. The former Prime Minister condemns directly the Labour shift towards the left and demands that the EU initiates reforms which make it more competitive in the economic field, vindicating that the United Kingdom could take a leadership in the global issues playing a part in it, not standing aside.
Corbyn, on his part, has assumed the Tory slogan of “Brexit is Brexit” as his own, arguing, like the conservatives, that any action intended to renegotiate the presence of the United Kingdom in the EU would be contrary to the whishes expressed by the British citizens. This sort of fair play can also be interpreted legitimately as an example of “cover euroscepticism” on the part of the current Labour leader, something a large sector of his parliamentary group has been accusing him of, confirming by doing so the ability of the “European question” to develop heterodox partnerships in the United Kingdom. On its behalf, the Tory Government has close ranks around the thesis defended mainly by Liam Fox, Boris Johnson and David Davis, this is, the so-called “hard Brexit” which gives priority to the issues related to immigration against the strictly trade ones, identifying the result of the 23 June referendum with the recovery on the part of the United Kingdom of its self-government, sovereignty and independence. In this sense, once euro-pragmatics as the very Theresa May, have accepted such proclamations, although they do not undervalue the importance the economic issues will gain in the negotiation to develop with the EU. Thereon, the different interventions of the Prime Minister, particularly since the annual Conservative Party Conference held last October, align in that direction in order to calm society in general and the business community particularly.
Likewise, opting for “hard Brexit” has served for the Tories to put a brake on the UKIP rise. Nevertheless, this momentary success also presents the risk of the adversaries of the Conservative Party insisting on pointing out that it has give in before populism, nationalism and xenophobia characterizing the party led until recently by Nigel Farage. The divisions which defined the conservatives on “Europe” can’t be seen currently with the former sharpness. The consensus seems assured in spite of the interventions of ancestry Europhiles like Ken Clarke, whose influence, as it was proved during the post-Thatcherism times, can be described as residual.
Even so, the main opposition that May’s Government is encountering is seen in the peripheral nationalisms in Scotland and Wales, represented by the Scottish National Party (SN) and The Party of Wales. However, these two grouping are not in the same position, nor do they have the same ability to influence their respective nations: while the Scottish nationalism rules in Scotland and it has wide representation in Westminster, the same cannot be said about the Welsh one.
Thus, the SNP has found in the victory of Brexit “a window of opportunity” to reincorporate to the political agenda a holding of a consultation like the one from September 2014. Thereon, the strategy followed by Nicola Sturgeon (First Minister of Scotland) resorts to a millimetric gradualism. She responds to each action of the British government considering that it proceeds against the Scottish interests, particularly when Mar defends the “hard Brexit”, which would leave Scotland out of the Single Market.
Henceforth, the SNP argues that the Tory Government has undervalued the perspective of the member countries of the United Kingdom. Consequently, this grievance would endorse the demand of the Scottish parliament, in which nationalism enjoys majority, to request the holding of a new referendum structured around the dialectical union versus separation.
As it can be inferred, the use of language of the SNP is outstanding, dodging responsibilities which they relegate to the British government and presenting a particular aspiration as if it was an overall demand.